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The rise of social media has brought renewed attention to a profound 
dilemma confronting democratic theory and practice.1 On the one hand, 
social media allows for new and accessible forms of speech, persuasion, 
and association, thereby strengthening the discourse that lies at the heart 
of a democratic system of government. On the other hand, social media 
gives rise to a host of ills, including fake news, polarization, echo 
chambers, extremism, radicalization, and fragmentation, which 
undermines the long-term health of democracy.2 Russian interference in 
the 2016 U.S. election provides the most vivid illustration of the 
destabilizing impact of social media on democracy. Domestic 
engagement in disinformation likewise poses a significant threat.3 
 
In one sense, the free speech dilemma is hardly new. The freedom of 
speech has always been indispensable for, yet potentially detrimental to, 
democracy. However, the familiar argument about the truth-revealing 
character of the marketplace of ideas has been put to the test in recent 
years, particularly in the face of fake news and the emergence of deep 
fakes. Moreover, the decline of democracy and the concomitant rise of 
populist authoritarianism around the globe has revealed the inherent 
 
1 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, #REPUBLIC: DIVIDED DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF SOCIAL 
MEDIA 24-25 (2017) (cataloguing the complex issues raised by social media for 
freedom of speech); Richard L. Hasen, Cheap Speech and What It Has Done (to 
American Democracy), 16 FIRST AMEND. REV. 200, 200 (2018) (observing that the 
democratization of speech has a dark side, namely the undermining of mediating and 
stabilizing institutions).  
2 Nathaniel Persily, Can Democracy Survive the Internet?, 28 J. DEMOCRACY 63 
(2017); Richard L. Hasen, Deep Fakes, Bots, and Siloed Justices: American Election 
Law in a “Post-Truth” World, 64 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 535, 535-36 (2020) (manuscript 
at 2-3). See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, #REPUBLIC: DIVIDED DEMOCRACY IN THE 
AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA (2017). 
3 Persily, supra note 2, at 70 (noting that “fake news is a problem because voters may 
be manipulated and make important policy and political choices based on dubious 
information”); Abby K. Wood & Ann M. Ravel, Fool Me Once: Regulating “Fake 
News” and Other Online Advertising, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 1223, 1237 (2018) (noting 
that disinformation damages democracy “by undermining our faith in our 
institutions, weakening voter competence, and splintering the electorate”). 
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fragility of democratic institutions, processes, and norms.4 The dilemma 
posed by social media thus presents an urgent issue when considering 
the ongoing health and sustainability of a democratic order.5 
  
This Article focuses on Canada’s efforts to confront the challenges of 
social media and disinformation. It makes two interrelated claims. First, 
it argues for a multifaceted public-private approach that employs a suite 
of complementary tactics including: (1) disclosure and transparency 
laws; (2) content-based regulation and self-regulation; (3) norm-based 
strategies; and (4) civic education and media literacy efforts. It outlines 
Canada’s efforts to inoculate the electoral process from the harms of 
disinformation, focusing in particular on both public and private 
initiatives for each of the four categories. In addition, it argues that the 
Canadian approach contains a mix of legal regulation (regulation 
imposed by the state), self-regulation (regulation by private actors), and 
co-regulation (regulation through cooperation between private actors 
and public actors).6 As such, the Canadian approach is multifaceted in 
two respects: first, because it employs a suite of tactics; and second, 
because it involves a mix of regulatory approaches.  
 
Second, the Article argues that the objective of this multifaceted public-
private approach is to optimize the tradeoff between defending against 
disinformation and protecting the freedom of speech. Removing all 
disinformation would be too costly from a free-speech perspective. The 
 
4 TOM GINSBURG & AZIZ Z. HUQ, HOW TO SAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 
163 (2018); STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE 5-10 
(2018).  
5 For an analysis of the harms of the internet, and possible reforms, see NATHANIEL 
PERSILY, KOFI ANNAN FOUNDATION THE INTERNET’S CHALLENGE TO DEMOCRACY: 
FRAMING THE PROBLEM AND ASSESSING REFORMS (2019). Professor Persily 
identifies a number of possible reforms, including deletion, demotion, disclosure, 
delay, dilution and divergence, deterrence, and digital literacy.” Id. at 6-7, 36-50. 
6Andreas Busch, Patrick Theiner & Yana Breindl, Internet Censorship in Liberal 
Democracies: Learning from Autocracies?, in MANAGING DEMOCRACY IN THE 
DIGITAL AGE: INTERNET REGULATION, SOCIAL MEDIA USE, AND ONLINE CIVIC 
ENGAGEMENT 16 (Julia Schwanholz, Peter-Tobias Stoll & Todd Graham eds., 2018). 
Generally, English-speaking countries (the United States, Canada, the United 
Kingdom) have preferred self-regulation, while EU members are more likely to use 
co-regulation and legal regulation. Id. at 20. 
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dilemma posed by social media is in some sense irresolvable and 
unavoidable. The Article catalogues the various shortcomings with the 
tactics adopted in Canada but it concludes that this multifaceted 
approach is preferable to no action at all. Despite the flaws of each 
tactic, the combined and interactive effects of a multifaceted approach 
provide helpful protections against some of the harms of disinformation 
while still protecting the freedom of speech. In addition, Canada’s 
multifaceted public-private approach signals the importance of electoral 
integrity thereby shoring up the public trust that is indispensable to 
sustaining a democratic order.7 Democratic stability depends in no small 
measure on citizen trust in the integrity of elections.  
 
This Article is organized in five sections. Part II provides a brief 
overview of the electoral system in Canada. Part III turns to disclosure 
and transparency laws, focusing in particular on the new legally 
mandated political ad registry and industry responses to it. Part IV 
addresses content-based regulation and content-based self-regulation. It 
claims that narrow content-based regulations prohibiting “false election 
speech,”8 as adopted in Canada, help to protect electoral integrity, and 
by extension, foster ongoing confidence in the democratic process. Part 
V examines two publicly-led initiatives—the Declaration on Electoral 
Integrity and the Digital Charter—which I suggest play an important 
role establishing and reinforcing democratic norms with respect to the 
digital world. Part VI focuses on citizen education and media literacy 
initiatives by both public and private entities, which help to build social 
resilience to disinformation. The conclusion summarizes the main 
themes. 
 
II. ELECTIONS IN CANADA 
 
The right to vote is constitutionally protected in Canada. Section 3 of 
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides that “every citizen of 
Canada has the right to vote in an election of the members of the House 
of Commons or of a legislative assembly and to be qualified for 
 
7 Hasen, supra note 1, at 33 (describing confidence in free and fair elections as the 
“bedrock of democracy”). 
8 Id. at 14. 
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membership therein.”9 The Charter contains two additional provisions 
that protect democratic rights. Section 4 sets a maximum duration of 
five years for the life of the House of Commons or a provincial 
legislature, although this period can be extended in the event of a 
national crisis. Section 5 guarantees a sitting of Parliament and the 
legislatures at least once every year. The democratic rights protected 
under sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Charter cannot be overridden by the 
legislative exercise of the notwithstanding clause in section 33, although 
they are subject under section 1 to “such reasonable limits prescribed by 
law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” 
The Supreme Court of Canada has handed down several significant 
election law decisions.10 For example, the court upheld the 
constitutionality of campaign finance regulations,11 struck down 
restrictions on inmate voting,12 and set a standard for electoral 
redistricting.13 
 
Canada has a first-past-the-post electoral system. National elections are 
governed by the Canada Elections Act, and administered by Elections 
Canada, an independent and non-partisan agency.14 In 2007, Canada 
adopted fixed election date legislation which stipulates that a general 
election is to take place every four years on the third Monday of 
October. Despite the fixed date legislation, the Governor General, on 
the advice of the Prime Minister, can still call an election at any time. 
Another important feature of the electoral system is the election period 
(also known as the writ period), which lasts for a minimum of 36 days 
before the date of the election. The Canada Elections Act sets out 
campaign finance limits for advertising expenses incurred by political 
 
9 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 3, Part I of the Constitution Act, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, 1982, c 11 (U.K.). 
10 For an overview of the Supreme Court of Canada’s election law decisions, see 
Yasmin Dawood, Democratic Rights, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE 
CANADIAN CONSTITUTION (Peter Oliver, Patrick Macklem & Nathalie Des Rosiers 
eds., 2017). 
11 Harper v. Canada, [2004] S.C.R. 827 (Can.). 
12 Sauvé v. Canada, [2002] S.C.R. 519 (Can.). 
13 Reference re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Sask), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 158 (Can.). 
14 For a discussion of the institutional role played by Elections Canada in the larger 
electoral ecosystem, see Daniel P. Tokaji, Campaign Finance Regulation in North 
America: An Institutional Perspective, 17 ELECTION L.J. 188, 195-96 (2018). 
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parties, candidates, and third parties during the election period. These 
advertising expenses are partially reimbursed subject to various 
requirements, thereby providing a significant public dimension to the 
campaign finance regime. The Canada Elections Act also establishes 
contribution limits for individuals and prohibits donations by 
corporations and unions. 
 
In December 2018, the federal government passed the Elections 
Modernization Act, Bill C-76 (the “Act”), which ushered in sweeping 
amendments to the Canada Elections Act. The Elections Modernization 
Act reversed several changes that had been introduced by the Fair 
Elections Act, which was enacted by the previous Conservative 
government in 2014.15 For example, the Act reintroduced vouching and 
allowed voter information cards to be used as proof of identity. The Act 
also introduced new rules, such as limiting the election period to 50 
days, introducing reporting requirements for third parties, implementing 
measures to prevent foreign interference, and requiring that online 
platforms maintain a registry of all digital political advertisements.16 
The Act also ushered in a new “pre-election period” which begins on 
the June 30th before the holding of a general election and ends on the 
first day of the election period.17 New campaign finance rules apply to 
 
15 The last major change to Canada’s elections laws was the Fair Elections Act, 
passed by the previous Conservative government in 2014. Major changes introduced 
by the Fair Elections Act included the elimination of vouching, limitations on what 
information the Chief Electoral Officer and Elections Canada could communicate to 
the public, moving the Commissioner of Canada Elections out of Elections Canada 
and into the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, and increasing donation 
limits. The Fair Elections Act was heavily criticized by experts, in particular by 
hundreds of academics who wrote two open letters, which generated considerable 
public attention (full disclosure: I was one of the principal authors of the open 
letters). See Melissa Williams et al., An Open Letter on the Fair Elections Act, 
GLOBE & MAIL (Apr. 23, 2014), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/an-open-
letter-from-academics-on-bill-c-23/article18114166/ [https://perma.cc/27KD-
7NQQ].  
16 Marco Vigliotti, Elections Bill Gets Royal Assent After Fractious Path Through 
Parliament, IPOLITICS (Dec. 14, 2018, 4:30 PM), https://ipolitics.ca/article/elections-
bill-gets-royal-assent-after-fractious-path-through-parliament/ 
[https://perma.cc/Q9MA-KDYT]. 
17 The election period often begins on the 37th day before the date of the general 
election, which for fixed date elections is the third Monday of October four years 
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political parties18 and third parties19 for advertising expenses during the 
pre-election period.  
 
III. DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY 
 
To respond to the problem of disinformation, the Canadian government 
has primarily relied on transparency and disclosure requirements for 
political advertising. The Election Modernization Act requires third 
parties to identify themselves using taglines in all partisan advertising 
messages during the pre-election period20 and all election advertising 
messages during the election period.21 Third parties must also comply 
with new accounting and disclosure requirements.22 In addition, 
political parties are now required to add disclaimers for partisan 
advertising messages.23 
 
The main mechanism, however, is that online platforms are now 
required to publish a digital registry of partisan and election advertising 
messages.24 Not every online platform, however, is subject to the 
requirement. The registry requirement applies only to online platforms 
 
after the last general election. Elections Modernization Act, S.C. 2018, c 31, s 2(7), 
amending Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c 9, s 2(1) (Can.). 
18 The limit on partisan advertising expenses during the pre-election period for 
registered political parties will be $2,046,800 for 2019 (a base amount of $1.4 
million, multiplied by an inflation adjustment factor). ELECTIONS CANADA, 
POLITICAL FINANCING HANDBOOK FOR REGISTERED PARTIES AND CHIEF AGENTS 70 
(Jun. 2019). 
19 ELECTIONS CANADA, POLITICAL FINANCING HANDBOOK FOR THIRD PARTIES, 
FINANCIAL AGENTS AND AUDITORS 30 (Jun. 2019). 
20 Elections Modernization Act, S.C. 2018, c 31, s 222(3), amending Canada 
Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c 9, s 349.5 (Can.). 
21 Id. at s 352. The taglines must contain the third party’s name, phone number, civic 
or internet address and an indication that it has authorized the message. 
22 Awanish Sinha et al., Canada’s Election Laws Are Changing–Here’s What You 
Need to Know, MCCARTHY TÉTRAULT LLP (May 10, 2019), 
https://www.mccarthy.ca/en/insights/articles/canadas-election-laws-are-changing-
heres-what-you-need-know [https://perma.cc/5F5L-7QKS]. 
23 Elections Modernization Act, S.C. 2018, c 31, s 262, amending Canada Elections 
Act, S.C. 2000, c 9, s 429.3 (Can.).  
24 Elections Modernization Act, S.C. 2018, c 31, s 208.1, amending Canada Elections 
Act, S.C. 2000, c 9, s 325.1(2) (Can.). 
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that, during a specified time period, had a certain number of monthly 
visits by internet users in Canada.25 Online platforms that meet this 
threshold must publish a digital registry of partisan advertising 
messages (which are displayed during the pre-election period) and 
election advertising messages (which are displayed during the election 
period) on the platform.26 Partisan advertising messages are basically 
the equivalent of express advocacy, while election advertising messages 
include express advocacy and issue advertising that is associated with a 
party or a candidate.27 As such, the Act requires online platforms to 
provide information about issue advertising during the election period 
but not during the pre-election period. 
 
In terms of specific requirements, the registry must include an electronic 
copy of each partisan or election advertising message published on the 
platform and the name of the person who authorized the message.28 The 
publication period of the registry is fairly lengthy. For election and 
partisan advertising messages, the platform must publish the relevant 
information starting on the first day the platform publishes the ad and 
ending two years after the end of the election period.29 The online 
platform must keep the information included in the registry for five 
years after the end of the publication period.30 The person or entity 
purchasing the advertisement is responsible for providing the platform 
 
25 Id. An online platform is broadly construed as any website or application that 
displays regulated advertising. 
26 Id. 
27 Election advertising is defined as “the transmission to the public by any means 
during an election period of an advertising message that promotes or opposes a 
registered party or the election of a candidate, including by taking a position on an 
issue with which a registered party or candidate is associated,” while partisan 
advertising is defined as “the transmission to the public by any means during a pre-
election period of an advertising message that promotes or opposes a registered party 
or eligible party or the election of a potential candidate, nomination contestant or 
leader of a registered party or eligible party, otherwise than by taking a position on 
an issue with which any such party or person is associated.” Canada Elections Act, 
S.C. 2000, c 9, s 2(1) (Can.). 
28 Elections Modernization Act, S.C. 2018, c 31, s 208.1, amending Canada Elections 
Act, S.C. 2000, c 9, s 325 (Can.). 
29 Id.  
30 Id.  
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with the necessary information for the online registry.31 Owners and 
operators of online platforms could face fines of up to $50,000 if they 
intentionally violate the registry requirement, whereas unintentional 
violations are subject to fines of up to $2,000, and/or a term of 
imprisonment of up to three months.32 
 
The Act’s online ad registry requirements are similar in approach to the 
proposed Honest Ads Act in the U.S.33 The objective of the proposed 
Honest Ads Act is to expand disclosure rules for online advertisements. 
The bill was prompted by concerns over Russian interference in the 
2016 U.S. presidential election, as well as the “growing centrality of 
online platforms in the lives of Americans.”34 The bill would expand the 
definition of “electioneering communication” to include paid internet 
and digital advertisements, placing such advertisements within the 
ambit of election and campaign finance laws.35 It would require online 
platforms that meet a threshold of monthly visitors to keep a publicly 
accessible record of all political ad purchases in excess of $500.36 It 
would also require “paid for” disclosures on a wide array of online ads. 
Media outlets and online platforms would be required to make 
“reasonable efforts” to ensure that foreign nationals are not buying 
political advertisements, directly or indirectly.37 The bill was 
reintroduced in 2019, but it is unlikely to pass in the Republican-
dominated Senate.38 
 
31 Id.  
32 Elections Modernization Act, S.C. 2018, c 31, s 349, amending Canada Elections 
Act, S.C. 2000, c 9, s 505(3) (Can.); Elections Modernization Act, S.C. 2018, c 31, s 
346(1), amending Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c 9, s 500(1) (Can.).  
33 For a discussion of the Honest Ads Act, see Brian Beyersdorf, Regulating the 
“Most Accessible Marketplace of Ideas in History”: Disclosure Requirements in 
Online Political Advertisements After the 2016 Election, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1061, 
1089-90 (2019).  
34 Honest Ads Act, S. 1356, 116th Cong. § 4 (2019). 
35 Maggie Miller, Bipartisan Group of Senators Seeks to Increase Transparency of 
Online Political Ads, HILL (May 8, 2019), 
https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/442598-bipartisan-group-of-senators-seek-to-
increase-transparency-of-online [https://perma.cc/U37R-HVJ5].  
36 Id.  
37 Honest Ads Act, S. 1356, 116th Cong. § 9 (2019). 
38 Miller, supra note 35. The House previously passed H.R. 1 which included the 
Honest Ads Act. 




There are advantages and drawbacks to Canada’s online ad registry.39 
On the plus side, the registry promises to enhance transparency and 
reduce disinformation because both the ad and the name of the person 
who authorized the message are made publicly available in the registry. 
There are, however, criticisms of the ad registry. First, some critics have 
argued that the ads registry does not go far enough because it does not 
require platforms to provide information about advertisers’ targeting 
strategies, thereby missing an opportunity for the public oversight of 
targeted advertising and for gathering data about the effectiveness of 
micro-targeting.40 A second drawback to the ads registry is that it is 
unlikely to uncover foreign interference. Foreign adversaries engaging 
in covert interference will most likely impersonate Canadian citizens 
and organizations and will not provide the platforms with genuine 
information. In the U.S., for example, employees of the Russian IRA 
entity impersonated U.S. individuals and entities in order to buy 
political ads on social media.41 
 
A third category of criticism is that online ad registries go too far. These 
registries may dampen free speech because online providers will forgo 
political advertising in order to avoid the reporting requirements. 
Concerns about self-censorship and overreach are mitigated somewhat 
by the fact that the registry applies only to paid advertisements, which 
Elections Canada has clarified as referring to messages that have or 
 
39 For a discussion of the drawbacks of disclosure as a general matter, see Abby K. 
Wood, Campaign Finance Disclosure, 14 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 11, 22-24 
(2018) (identifying costs of disclosure as chilling speech, harassment, onerous 
reporting requirements, and the facilitation of corruption). For an analysis of the 
administrative and enforcement challenges connected with regulating political 
advertising on social media in Canada, see Michael Pal, Social Media and 
Democracy: Challenges for Election Law and Administration in Canada, 19 
ELECTION L.J. 200, 204-205 (2020).  
40 Jesse Hirsh, Canadian Elections Can’t Side-step Social Media Influence, CTR. FOR 
INT’L GOVERNANCE INNOVATION (Nov. 20, 2018), 
https://www.cigionline.org/articles/canadian-elections-cant-side-step-social-media-
influence [https://perma.cc/9TRU-N4X7]. 
41 ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION 
INTO RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 14 (Mar. 2019). 
For a similar argument, see Pal, supra note 39, at 204. 
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would otherwise have a placement cost.42 As a result, many forms of 
political communication will escape the requirements.43 For instance, 
advertising messages could avoid the registry if they are posted for free 
on social media, even if expenses were incurred in their creation. The 
regulations also explicitly exclude a number of categories of 
communication, including: (1) text messages, e-mails, and other private 
messages; (2) user-generated content posted for free on social media; 
(3) editorials, columns, or news articles; and (4) messages and content, 
including videos, on a political entity’s own website or on free websites, 
such as YouTube.44  
 
With respect to self-censorship by online platforms, the experience in 
Canada has been mixed. In response to the online registry requirement, 
several online platforms, including Microsoft (Bing, MSN), Reddit, 
Amazon.ca, and Google banned political ads during the Canadian 
election altogether, citing concerns about setting up the registries in the 
given time period.45 Google announced in March 2019 that it would be 
banning political advertising on its platforms ahead of the 2019 federal 
election, on the basis that the new ad registry rules would be too difficult 
to comply with in the time frame.46 A 2016 study estimated that Google 
accounted for 47.7% of Internet advertising market share in Canada.47 
Google’s decision to not accept political advertising could have 
 
42 New Registry Requirements for Political Ads on Online Platforms, ELECTIONS 
CAN. [hereinafter New Registry Requirements], 
https://elections.ca/content.aspx?section=pol&dir=regifaq&document=index&lang=e 
[https://perma.cc/4S2W-5QLP]. 
43 Joan Bryden, New Registry Law for Online Ads Only Applies to Paid Campaigns: 
Elections Canada, GLOBAL NEWS (Apr. 24, 2019, 7:19 PM), 
https://globalnews.ca/news/5200262/online-registry-political-adverts/ 
[https://perma.cc/WR39-3VKD]. 
44 New Registry Requirements, supra note 42. 
45 Elizabeth Thompson, Most of Canada’s Top Websites Won’t Post Federal Election 
Ads This Year, CBC NEWS (May 1, 2019, 4:00 AM), 
https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/online-election-advertising-canada-1.5116753 
[https://perma.cc/L3JU-7AZA]. 
46 Tom Cardoso, Google To Ban Political Ads Ahead of Federal Election, Cites New 
Transparency Rules, GLOBE & MAIL (Mar. 4, 2019), 
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-google-to-ban-political-ads-ahead-
of-federal-election-citing-new/ [https://perma.cc/7DRP-CCRJ]. 
47 Id.  
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impacted other websites as well given their reliance on Google for 
programmatic ad serving.48  
 
Twitter banned partisan political advertisements during the pre-election 
period, which began on June 30, 2019.49 The reason for the ad 
prohibition was that Twitter had to build the necessary infrastructure 
support.50 Issue advertisements, however, were permitted over the 
summer.51 Twitter planned to launch its online ad registry once the 
election period began, at which time both partisan and issue 
advertisements would be permitted. However, in October 2019, Twitter 
adopted a global prohibition of paid political content.52 
 
Elections Canada confirmed that companies were still bound by their 
obligations under the law even if they banned political ads on their 
platform, and that they could be fined thousands of dollars if regulated 
ads appeared on their site without being included in a registry.53 These 
fines, however, may not furnish a significant deterrence given the 
 
48 Elizabeth Thompson, Who Authorized That Election Ad? Under New Rules 
Website Owners Must Know Before They Display, CBC NEWS (Jun. 30, 2019, 4:00 
AM), https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/election-online-advertising-canada-
1.5195484 [https://perma.cc/D3M2-FKU4]. 
49 Id.  
50 Michele Austin, Providing Clarity on Political Advertising in Canada, TWITTER 
(June 26, 2019), 
https://blog.twitter.com/en_ca/topics/company/2019/political_advertising_in_canada.
html [https://perma.cc/97SX-33ML]. 
51 Elizabeth Thompson, Twitter Banning Political Ads in Canada Until Election 
Campaign, CBC NEWS (June 26, 2019, 10:06 AM), 
https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/twitter-online-advertising-election-1.5190465 
[https://perma.cc/KE8W-RYE2]. 
52 The Associated Press, Twitter Bans All Political Advertising on its Service, 
Diverging From Rival Facebook, CBC NEWS (Oct. 30, 2019, 5:08 PM), 
https://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/twitter-bans-political-advertisements-
1.5341655 [https://perma.cc/CQA4-NJZN]. 
53 Rachel Aiello, Online Platforms Warned of Fines, Charges if They Don’t Comply 
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revenue generated by online advertising.54 Furthermore, political ad 
bans by online platforms may be ineffective because these platforms 
could continue to sell advertising space despite the restrictions. In 
response to Washington state’s political advertising transparency 
regulations, for example, both Google and Facebook announced that 
they would no longer sell political ads for local races because they could 
not meet the state’s disclosure requirements.55 However, in spite of its 
ban on political ads, Google continued to sell ads for Washington state 
campaigns, receiving more than $13,000 for ads targeting the November 
2018 election.56  
 
While most online platforms in Canada experienced some difficulty 
complying with new ad registry legislation, Facebook appeared to have 
complied by rolling out several new initiatives. First, Facebook 
announced the launch of an Ad Library in June 2019 in order to meet 
the ad registry requirements in the Elections Modernization Act.57 Ads 
about social issues, elections, or politics will remain in the Ad Library 
for 7 years, including demographic information about the ad’s viewers 
such as age, gender, and location.58 Facebook had already established a 
publicly searchable archive of all political and issue advertisements on 
Facebook and Instagram in the United States.59 Second, Facebook 
identified Canada-specific issues for the “Ads About Social Issues, 
 
54 Sara Salinas, Alphabet Drops After Revealing Declining Advertising Prices and 
Rising Costs, CNBC (Feb. 4, 2019, 3:33 PM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/04/alphabet-earnings-q4-2018.html 
[https://perma.cc/TC5D-DL5P]. 
55 Eli Sanders, Since Google Banned Political Ads in Washington State, It’s Sold 
More Than $13K of Them, STRANGER (Jan. 16, 2019, 8:55 AM), 
https://www.thestranger.com/slog/2019/01/16/37975177/google-banned-political-
ads-in-washington-state-then-kept-on-selling-them [https://perma.cc/C6YW-YA9D]. 
56 Id.  
57 Facebook Can., Facebook Launches Ads Transparency Tools In Canada Ahead Of 




58 Id.  
59 Rob Leathern, Shining a Light on Ads With Political Content, FACEBOOK 
NEWSROOM (May 24, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/05/ads-with-
political-content/ [https://perma.cc/C77Y-SUXU]. 
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Elections or Politics” policy.”60 Social issues are broadly defined to 
include the following topics: civil and social rights, economy, 
environmental politics, health, immigration, political values and 
governance, security and foreign policy.61 Elections or politics include 
political figures, political parties, legislation and “get out the vote” 
campaigns.62 Ads about social issues will remain in the Ad Library for 
7 years, and will be accompanied by various metrics such as its range of 
impressions and the demographic information of the people who saw 
the ad.63 Third, Facebook implemented an authorization process for all 
advertisers in Canada who are running ads about social issues, elections, 
or politics.64 The authorization process requires advertisers to confirm 
their identity and location in Canada in addition to disclosing the person 
responsible for the ad.65 Fourth, Facebook began offering access to the 
Ad Library API, which allows customized keyword searches of the ads 
stored in the Ad library.66 Researchers, journalists, and academics can 
use the API to study political advertising and social issues. As discussed 
in Part IV.B below, however, there are significant concerns about how 
digital platforms, including Facebook, engage in self-regulation of fake 
news. 
 
In sum, the main drawback to mandatory disclosure such as the political 
ad registry requirement is self-censorship. However, once online 
platforms have built the necessary infrastructure, the benefits from 
disclosure are significant. It should be noted, however, that the ad 
registry requirement applies only to paid political content; as such, there 




60 Facebook Can., supra note 57.  
61 Press Release, Facebook Can., Canada Authorizations Digital One-Sheet: New 




62 Id.  
63 Facebook Can., supra note 57.  
64 Id.  
65 Id.  
66 Id.  
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IV. CONTENT-BASED REGULATION AND SELF 
REGULATION 
 
Content-based regulations for combatting disinformation raise 
significant free speech concerns. France’s fake news law, for example, 
has been described as censorship by opposition politicians and the 
media.67 Some countries have imposed criminal penalties for the 
creation or dissemination of fake news.68 For instance, Singapore has 
passed a law requiring online media platforms carry warnings or remove 
content the government deems false, with violations carrying a prison 
term of up to 10 years.69 Russia has passed several laws targeting fake 
news, including a bill that bans the spread of “unreliable socially-
important information” that could endanger public security and order.70 
According to Freedom House, the broad wording of the Russian 
legislation allows for politically motivated removals in addition to 
threatening the freedom of expression.71 Given the need to protect the 
freedom of speech, government bans on fake news are not a viable 





67 Ciara Nugent, France Is Voting on a Law Banning Fake News. Here’s How It 
Could Work, TIME (June 7, 2018), http://time.com/5304611/france-fake-news-law-
macron/ [https://perma.cc/QB3X-GTBQ]. 
68 Alana Schetzer, Governments Are Making Fake News a Crime–but It Could Stifle 
Free Speech, CONVERSATION (July 7, 2019, 4:10 PM), 
https://theconversation.com/governments-are-making-fake-news-a-crime-but-it-
could-stifle-free-speech-117654 [https://perma.cc/9WYC-B2Z5]. 
69 Singapore Fake News Law a ‘Disaster’ for Freedom of Speech, Says Rights 
Group, GUARDIAN (May 9, 2019, 12:20 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/09/singapore-fake-news-law-a-
disaster-for-freedom-of-speech-says-rights-group [https://perma.cc/T9QF-M54J]. 
70 Vladimir Isachenkov, Russian Bill Aims To Crack Down on ‘Fake News’ and 
Disrespect to the Government,  GLOBAL NEWS (Mar. 12, 2019, 10:55 AM), 
https://globalnews.ca/news/5047214/russian-bill-crack-down-fake-news-disrespect-
government/ [https://perma.cc/F9SE-LH5G]. 
71 Freedom on the Net 2018 – Russia Country Report, FREEDOM HOUSE, 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2018/russia [https://perma.cc/E9HG-
JF8G]. 
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a. Government Restrictions on Misleading Publications 
and False Statements 
 
Canada has two narrow content-based restrictions to target “false 
election speech,” which Richard Hasen has defined as false speech 
about the mechanics of voting.72 The Canadian version covers a broader 
category of speech since it also addresses false statements about 
candidates and party leaders. These restrictions apply only during the 
election period. 
 
With respect to the first mechanism, the prohibition on misleading 
publications, the Elections Modernization Act creates an offence of 
distributing or publishing any material during an election period that 
purports to be “made, distributed, transmitted or published by or under 
the authority of the Chief Electoral Officer, or a returning officer, 
political party, candidate or prospective candidate” where the material 
was not authorized but was published with the intent of misleading the 
public into believing that it was so authorized.73 Previously, only the 
impersonation of such persons was prohibited under the Canada 
Elections Act.74 The restriction also provides factors a court may use to 
determine whether the offense has been committed, including whether 
the material contained a name, logo, or domain name that is “distinctive 
and commonly associated with” the Chief Electoral Officer, political 
party, or candidate.75 The prohibition exempts parody and satire.76 
 
The second legal mechanism to combat disinformation is the prohibition 
on publishing false statements to affect election results. The Elections 
Modernization Act made significant amendments to an existing 
prohibition in Section 91 of the Canada Elections Act. As revised by the 
Act, Section 91 prohibits a person with the intention of affecting the 
 
72 Hasen, supra note 1, at 14. 
73 Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c 9, s 481, as amended by Elections 
Modernization Act, S.C. 2018, c 31, s 323 (Can.). 
74 Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c 9, s 480.1 (Can.), as it appeared on January 18, 
2019. 
75 Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c 9, s 481, as amended by Elections 
Modernization Act, S.C. 2018, c 31, s 323 (Can.). 
76 Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c 9, ss 480.1(2), 481(3) (Can.). 
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results of an election from making or publishing during the election 
period (1) a false statement that a candidate, prospective candidate, 
party leader, or public figure associated with a party has committed a 
federal or provincial offense (or has been charged with or is under 
investigation for an offense) and (2) a false statement about the 
“citizenship, place of birth, education, professional qualifications or 
membership in a group or association” with respect to a candidate, 
prospective candidate, party leader, or public figure associated with a 
party.77 The previous version of Section 91 prohibited persons from 
knowingly making any false statement of fact relating to a candidate or 
prospective candidate’s “personal character or conduct” with the 
intention of affecting the results of an election.78 The revised version 
removes the word “knowingly” from Section 91, thereby broadening the 
scope of the restrictions. The revised version has also been expanded to 
include statements about the leader of a political party or a public figure 
associated with a political party. At the same time, the revised version 
significantly narrows the type of content covered from false statements 
about “personal character or conduct” to false statements about an 
itemized list of basic facts. The Elections Modernization Act also 
revised Section 92, which originally forbade any person from 
“knowingly” making false statements that a candidate has withdrawn 
but which was revised to exclude the word “knowingly.”79  
 
These two government measures—the prohibition on misleading 
publications and the prohibition on false statements—raise 
constitutional concerns. In R. v. Zundel, the Supreme Court of Canada 
affirmed that false speech is constitutionally protected under section 
2(b) of the Charter. The court struck down a provision of the Criminal 
Code which prohibited the publication of false information or news.80 
The defendant had been convicted for violating this false news provision 
 
77 Elections Modernization Act, S.C. 2018, c 31, s 61, amending Canada Elections 
Act, S.C. 2000, c 9, ss 91, 92 (Can.). 
78 Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c 9, s 91 (Can.) as it appeared on January 18, 
2019. 
79 Elections Modernization Act, S.C. 2018, c 31, s 61, amending Canada Elections 
Act, S.C. 2000, c 9, s 92 (Can.). 
80 R. v. Zundel, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731 (Can.). 
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due to his publication of a booklet espousing denial of the Holocaust.81 
The court rejected the idea that deliberate lies can never have social 
value, and noted the difficulty in determining whether some statements 
are true or false.82 Despite the holding in Zundel, the Supreme Court of 
Canada has generally been more receptive to restrictions on speech as 
compared to the U.S. Supreme Court. For instance, the Supreme Court 
of Canada upheld the constitutionality of restrictions on speech such as 
pornography, hate speech, and commercial speech. In general, if the 
restriction is minimally impairing, and if the salutary effects of the law 
outweigh the deleterious effects, a court is likely to find the restriction 
on speech to be justified. Crucially, for the two false election speech 
measures at issue, the court has also upheld the constitutionality of 
campaign finance regulations.83 In addition, the court upheld a 
regulation which prohibited the publicizing of election results from 
some electoral districts before polls had closed in others.84 While the 
court subjects restrictions on the right to vote to rigorous scrutiny, it 
tends to be deferential to Parliament when it comes to many of the rules 
that govern the electoral process.85 
 
With respect to the restriction on misleading publications, a court is 
likely to find that the regulation violates the freedom of expression but 
is nonetheless justified under section 1 of the Charter. The ban on 
misleading publications applies only to publications which purport to be 
published by Elections Canada, a political party, or a candidate. It 
applies only during the election period and it exempts parody and satire. 
The restriction is narrowly drawn to prevent misinformation that could 





82 Id.  
83 Harper v. Canada, 2004 SCC 33, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827 (Can.). 
84 R. v. Bryan, 2007 SCC 12, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 527 (Can.). 
85 See Yasmin Dawood, Democracy and the Right to Vote: Rethinking Democratic 
Rights Under the Charter, 51 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 251 (2013); see also Yasmin 
Dawood, Electoral Fairness and the Law of Democracy: A Structural Rights 
Approach to Judicial Review, 62 U. TORONTO L.J. 499 (2012). 
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The prohibition on false statements, however, presents a closer case. Its 
constitutionality has been recently challenged in court.86 A central 
question is whether the Supreme Court’s decision in R. v. Zundel, the 
false speech case discussed above, can be distinguished. One important 
distinction is that the prohibition at issue in Zundel was very broad since 
it banned “false statements deemed likely to injure or cause mischief to 
any public interest.”87 By contrast, the revised Section 91 is far narrower 
in scope. It only covers, in the context of an election, false statements 
about a limited range of topics: citizenship, place of birth, education, 
professional qualifications, membership in a group or association, and 
the commission of an offense (or being charged with or under 
investigation for an offense). It is even narrower than the previous 
version of Section 91, which forbade false statements about the 
candidate’s personal character or conduct. Indeed, the Commissioner of 
Canada Elections Yves Côté, when testifying before the Senate in 
November 2018, described the revised version of Section 91 as 
“unnecessarily restrictive” because it no longer covered a wide range of 
false statements.88 In addition, the restriction only applies during the 
election period, further limiting its impact on free expression. That 
being said, the revised Section 91 no longer requires that the false 
statement be made “knowingly,” thereby broadening the scope of 
affected speech. While it is difficult to prove that a person knew a 
statement was false, removing the knowledge requirement means that 
the innocent replication of a false statement, such as by sharing it over 
social media, could also amount to a publication of that statement under 
Section 91. Even though it is highly unlikely that Section 91 would be 
enforced in such situations, there is no explicit exemption for innocent 
 
86 A Charter challenge has been filed against Section 91 on the basis that it violates the 
Charter’s protection of freedom of expression under section 2(b). See Canadian 
Constitutional Foundation v. Attorney General of Canada, Notice of Application filed 
in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Docket CV - 1900627380 (Sept. 13, 2019). 
The Ontario Superior Court declined the Canadian Constitution Foundation’s 
application to have the issue determined on an urgent basis during the election period 
of the 2019 federal election. See Canadian Constitution Foundation v. Canada 
(Attorney General), 2019 ONSC 5795, at para. 8. As of this writing, the case has yet 
to be heard. 
87 Zundel, [1992] 2 S.C.R. at 743. 
88 Canada, Parliament, Debates of the Senate, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, Vol 150, No 244 at 
6725 (Nov. 6, 2018) (statement of Comm’r of Can. Elections Yves Côté), 
https://sencanada.ca/en/content/sen/chamber/421/debates/244db_2018-11-06-e#52. 
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errors. The lack of a knowledge requirement is partially offset by the 
requirement that the person making the false statement intends to affect 
the results of the election. Unlike the ban on misleading publications, 
however, the prohibition on false statements lacks exemptions for satire 
and parody. In addition, the revised Section 91 includes false statements 
made about public figures “associated with” a party, which could in 
theory cover any public figure whose political affiliation is a matter of 
public record. 
 
On the other hand, a court could be persuaded that the prohibition is a 
necessary protection against the harm of false election information. 
Electoral disinformation disseminated through social media could 
seriously undermine the fairness and integrity of an election, and by 
extension, could destabilize public confidence in the election. Like the 
ban on misleading publications, the prohibition on false statements is 
meant to prohibit a constrained subset of fake news that could mislead 
voters about essential information necessary for informed voting. The 
measure does not prohibit false statements about the vast majority of 
political issues at stake in an election, which mitigates to some degree 
concerns about the prohibition’s chilling effect on speech. The fact that 
the prior version of section 91, which was broader in its reach, had 
already been in operation likewise mitigates such concerns. As revised, 
Section 91 focuses on certain basic facts about a candidate, such as 
citizenship and place of birth, which are verifiable and therefore raise 
fewer thorny questions about the definition of “false” speech. Given 
current concerns about disinformation and foreign interference,  a court 
could find that the main thrust of Section 91 is constitutional but it 
would likely only do so while simultaneously reading in exemptions for 
innocent errors, and for satire or parody, in addition to excluding the 
provision’s application to public figures associated with a party. 
Alternatively, a court could issue a suspended declaration of invalidity 
to enable the government to include such exemptions and tailor the 
scope of the prohibition. Because it is a close constitutional question, 
much will ultimately turn on the sufficiency of the government’s 
evidence not only with respect to the harm of disinformation in general 
but also with respect to the narrower issue of the harm caused by false 
statements concerning certain basic facts about candidates and party 
leaders. 
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b. Content-Based Self-Regulation 
 
In many liberal democracies, online platforms engage in the self-
regulation of user-generated content.89 The platforms are incentivized 
by statutory limited liability regimes under which intermediaries are not 
held responsible for third party content.90 In exchange for the limited 
liability, online platforms are asked to cooperate with government 
requests to remove illegal content.91 Content removal regulation broadly 
follows a notice-and-takedown approach rather than requiring platforms 
to monitor content on an ongoing basis. Online platforms, however, are 
increasingly seeking out and removing certain types of content. 
Typically, content filtering is restricted to extremist and terrorist 
speech.92 Facebook is developing technology, including artificial 
intelligence, to proactively remove content such as nudity and graphic 
violence, hate speech, fake accounts, spam, and terrorist propaganda.93 
Online platforms also vet paid political content, although they do so 
without significant accountability or transparency.94 However, Mark 
Zuckerberg announced in October 2019 that Facebook would not police 
 
89 See Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes 
Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598 (2018) (arguing that private 
content platforms are systems of governance); see also Persily, supra note 2, at 74 
(arguing that online platforms are the “new intermediary institutions for our present 
politics”). 
90 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE ROLE OF 
INTERNET INTERMEDIARIES IN ADVANCING PUBLIC POLICY OBJECTIVES 75 (2011). In 
Canada, the Supreme Court upheld the innocent dissemination defense for online 
platforms. Crookes v. Newton, 2011 SCC 47, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 269 (Can.). 
91 See Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private 
Governance, and New School Speech Regulation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1149, 1179 
(2018) (noting that governments “aim at infrastructure providers in order to get them 
to censor or regulate the speech of people that governments cannot easily otherwise 
control”). 
92 Klonick, supra note 89, at 1638. 
93 Guy Rosen, F8 2018: Using Technology to Remove the Bad Stuff Before It’s Even 
Reported, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (May 2, 2018), 
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/05/removing-content-using-ai/ 
[https://perma.cc/BNZ9-47HK]. 
94 Daniel Kreiss & Shannon C. McGregor, The “Arbiters of What Our Voters See”: 
Facebook and Google’s Struggle with Policy, Process, and Enforcement Around 
Political Advertising, 36 POL. COMM. 499, 500 (2019). 
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political advertising on the grounds that tech companies should not be 
monitoring political content, even if the content contains false claims.95 
 
Although online platforms initially resisted the idea that misinformation 
spread through their platforms could sway election results, they have 
since taken steps to address election interference.96 As discussed above, 
Facebook established an Ad Library to comply with the digital registry 
requirements of the Elections Modernization Act.97 In 2017, Facebook 
launched the Canadian Election Integrity Initiative.98 The initiative 
includes a digital news literacy campaign, a crisis hotline for politicians 
and political parties whose accounts are hacked, and a “cyber hygiene” 
guide for Canadian politicians.99 The objective of the cyber hygiene 
guide is to provide politicians with information on cyber threats and 
social media security management.100 In June 2018, Facebook launched 
third-party fact-checking with an international certified fact-checker, 
Agence France-Presse (AFP).101 AFP fact-checkers review news 
stories, photos, and videos and rate them for accuracy.102 Facebook 
reduces the distribution of stories that are rated “false” and it also 
informs those who have already shared the false story that there is 
 
95 Facebook Has No Business Policing Political Speech, Zuckerberg Argues, CBC 
NEWS (Oct. 17, 2019, 12:35 PM), https://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/zuckerberg-
facebook-free-speech-1.5324440 [https://perma.cc/7D45-LDU5]. 
96 Persily, supra note 2, at 73. 
97 Facebook Launches Ads Transparency Tools in Canada Ahead of 2019 Federal 
Election, CISION, (June 10, 2019), https://www.newswire.ca/news-releases/facebook-
launches-ads-transparency-tools-in-canada-ahead-of-2019-federal-election-
807760417.html [https://perma.cc/F9G4-3FDJ]. 
98 Rahul Kalvapalle, Facebook Canada Unveils Plan to Fight Fake News, Hacking in 
Lead-up to 2019 Election, GLOBAL NEWS (Oct. 19, 2017), 
https://globalnews.ca/news/3814648/facebook-canadian-election-integrity-initiative/ 
[https://perma.cc/R245-UK9E].    
99 Id.  
100 Cyber Hygiene Guide: Politicians and Political Parties, FACEBOOK CANADA 
(2017), http://facebookcanadianelectionintegrityinitiative.com/files/Cyber-Hygiene-
Report-en-ca.pdf [https://perma.cc/4QTY-GTC5]. 
101 About This Project, FACEBOOK CANADIAN ELECTION INTEGRITY INITIATIVE, 
http://facebookcanadianelectionintegrityinitiative.com/about.html 
[https://perma.cc/CL66-7KJU]. 
102 Id.  
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additional reporting.103 If a Facebook page is a repeat offender, 
Facebook will reduce the distribution of the page as a whole, and will 
also prevent it from advertising or making money on the site.104 One 
fact-checking AFP journalist has revealed that between 300 to 2,000 
posts are flagged in Canada every day.105 A common category is fake 
news about immigration, religion, or the current government.106 
 
The impact of fact-checking is questionable. For example, Facebook’s 
fact-checking program debunked a false story which claimed that 200 
soldiers from Mali were sent to Canada and then disappeared.107 
Although the false post was flagged by AFP’s Canada bureau, it 
received 14,600 engagements on Facebook as compared to only 109 
engagements for AFP’s fact-checking post.108 Facebook claims, 
however, that false articles have dropped by 80% thanks to the fact-
checking program.109 However, there is no independent verification 
process. Critics have argued that Facebook should make its data 
 
103 Aaron Wherry, Facebook’s Fake News Squad Comes to Canada – Just in Time 
for 2019, CBC NEWS (June 27, 2018, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/facebook-fact-check-canada-1.4722349 
[https://perma.cc/8WBJ-RZXV]. 
104 Tessa Lyons, Hard Questions: How Is Facebook’s Fact-Checking Program 
Working?, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (June 14, 2018), 
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/06/hard-questions-fact-checking/ 
[https://perma.cc/66TG-58LM]. 
105 Meet the Montreal-Based Journalist Fact-Checking False News on Facebook, 
CBC NEWS (Oct. 10, 2018, 2:16 PM), 
https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/fake-news-fact-checker-louis-baudoin-
laarman-1.4857159 [https://perma.cc/58GA-T3LZ]. 
106 Id.  
107 Louis Baudoin-Laarman, Non, 200 soldats maliens ne se sont pas “volatilisés 
dans la nature” au Canada [No, 200 Malian Soldiers Did Not “Vanish into the 
Wild” in Canada], AFP FACTUEL (Jan. 15, 2019, 1:59 PM), 
https://factuel.afp.com/non-200-soldats-maliens-ne-se-sont-pas-volatilises-dans-la-
nature-au-canada [https://perma.cc/XJ7Y-ASBN]. 
108 Daniel Funke, This Hoax Got 250 Times More Facebook Engagement Than Two 
Fact Checks Combined, POYNTER (Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.poynter.org/fact-
checking/2019/this-hoax-got-250-times-more-facebook-engagements-than-two-fact-
checks-combined/ [https://perma.cc/KFB9-F968]. 
109 Wherry, supra note 103. 
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publicly available so that there can be an independent assessment of the 
impact of fact-checking on the prevalence of fake news.110  
 
In addition to complying with the ad registry requirements, Twitter set 
up a site integrity team to monitor the platform on a daily basis, and to 
ensure the authenticity of tweets during the election period.111 In July 
2019, Twitter announced that it was rolling out a pilot project in Canada 
that would allow users to hide some responses on their tweets, with 
readers needing to click on a feature to reveal them. While the hidden 
replies would be available, they would not be included in the original 
tweet thread.112 The objective of this feature is to give users greater 
control over the debates prompted by their tweets.113 Twitter took other 
steps to prevent disruption of the election, such as cracking down on 
bots, and working with Elections Canada and the Commissioner of 
Canada Elections.114 Critics contend, however, that Twitter had not 
done enough to prevent abuse on its platform, including the use of 
automated bots.115  
 
While there are benefits to content-based self-regulation, a certain 
amount of skepticism is warranted. It must be kept in mind, as Abby 
Wood and Ann Ravel observe, that there is a conflict of interest at work 
because online platforms are primarily motivated by a profit motive, 
rendering them unreliable as self-regulators due to the revenue streams 
generated by disinformation.116 Nor are online platforms reliable 
defenders of democracy. As Nathaniel Persily argues, online platforms 
“were not created principally to serve democratic values and do not have 
as their lodestar the fostering of a well-informed and critically minded 
electorate.”117 
 
110 Id.  
111 Thompson, supra note 51. 
112 Elizabeth Thompson, Twitter Pilot Project Will Allow Canadians to Hide Replies 
to Posts – to a Point, CBC NEWS (July 11, 2019, 10:34 AM), 
https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/twitter-canada-hiding-posts-1.5207923 
[https://perma.cc/LAV2-MLCG]. 
113 Id.  
114 Id.  
115 Id.  
116 Wood & Ravel, supra note 3, at 1237, 1245. 
117 Persily, supra note 2, at 74. 
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V. NORM-BASED INITIATIVES 
 
The Canadian government has launched two norm-based initiatives to 
address disinformation. These public-led initiatives identify standards, 
best practices, and objectives to govern the digital world. The first 
initiative is the Declaration on Election Integrity, a non-binding 
document issued by the (now-abolished) Ministry of Democratic 
Institutions and signed by several major online companies. The second 
initiative, the Digital Charter, which was issued by the Ministry of 
Innovation, Science and Economic Development, sets out ten principles 
that will be used by the government to guide innovation and regulation. 
 
The first initiative, The Declaration on Electoral Integrity, was 
announced by the government in May 2018. It was designed “to help 
combat the spread of misinformation in the run-up to the fall federal 
election . . . .”118 Major companies, including Facebook, Microsoft, 
Google, and Twitter, signed on to the Declaration.119 The Declaration 
acknowledged the dilemma posed by social media, noting that while 
social media plays “a meaningful role in promoting a healthy and 
resilient democracy,” online platforms have also been “used to spread 
disinformation in an attempt to undermine free and fair elections and 
core democratic institutions and aggravate existing societal tensions.”120 
The Declaration also stated that the government and online platforms 
would work together to protect the upcoming election and “to support 
healthy political discourse.”121 To this end, the Declaration identified 
three pillars—integrity, transparency, and authenticity—with 
corresponding objectives for each pillar.122 
 
 
118 Josh O’Kane, Ottawa Asks Social Media Platforms to Combat Misinformation 
Ahead of Election, GLOBE & MAIL (May 27, 2019), 
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-ottawa-asks-social-media-to-
combat-misinformation-ahead-of-election/ [https://perma.cc/22CM-7MB4]. 
119 Id.  
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With respect to integrity, online platforms committed to intensify their 
efforts to combat disinformation and promote transparency while 
keeping Canadians informed about their “efforts to safeguard the 
Internet ecosystem.”123 They would also apply their most effective tools 
to protect democratic processes and institutions, in particular with 
respect to cybersecurity incidents, the protection of privacy, and the 
protection against the misrepresentation of candidates, parties, and 
electoral officials.124 With respect to transparency, online platforms 
committed to ensure transparency for regulated political advertising, 
and to ensure that their terms and conditions are easily accessible and 
fairly enforced. As for authenticity, online platforms pledged to remove 
fake accounts and inauthentic content on their platforms, block and 
remove malicious bots, and help users understand the sources of 
information.125 For its part, the government committed to provide online 
platforms with points-of-contact for election-related matters, and the 
public with clear and impartial information on any cyber incidents. It 
also pledged to promote information sharing that could help to identify 
and thwart malicious actors.126 Both the government and online 
platforms committed to work with civil society and educational 
institutions to support efforts to improve digital literacy and 
cybersecurity practices.127  
  
A year later, in May 2019, the federal government announced a second 
initiative, the Digital Charter.128 The purpose of the Digital Charter is to 
modernize the regulatory framework for the digital sphere while 
rehabilitating citizens’ trust in the digital landscape. The Charter 
identifies ten principles which will provide a framework for harnessing 
the power of digital transformation while protecting citizens’ privacy.129 
 
123 Id. 
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128 Press Release, Innovation, Sci. & Econ. Dev. Can., Gov’t Can., Minister Bains 
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The ten principles of the Charter are: universal access; safety and 
security; control and consent; transparency, portability and 
interoperability; open and modern digital government; a level playing 
field; data and digital for good; strong democracy; freedom from hate 
and violent extremism; and strong enforcement and real 
accountability.130 Although the Digital Charter does not have legal 
force, the government indicated that it would aim to introduce new 
legislation after the 2019 federal election.131  
 
While both the Declaration on Electoral Integrity and the Digital Charter 
are publicly-led initiatives, the Declaration on Electoral Integrity has the 
advantage of also being privately endorsed by online platforms. The 
main drawback to a norms-based approach, however, is that it relies on 
large social media platforms to do the right thing rather than requiring 
them to do so. That being said, there is value to the Declaration on 
Electoral Integrity and the Digital Charter because they establish 
democracy-enhancing norms which will help to guide actions or at the 
very least will provide a standard by which to judge actions taken or not 
taken. Not only do norms play a crucial role in regulating democratic 
practices, they also have the potential of being adopted at some point as 
mandatory regulations. 
 
VI. MEDIA LITERACY AND CITIZEN EDUCATION 
 
Prior to the 2019 federal election, the Canadian government announced 
funding of $7 million under the auspices of the Digital Citizen Initiative 
to promote digital media literacy.132 The literacy program would be 
 
130 Canada’s Digital Charter: Trust in a Digital World, GOV’T  CAN.: INNOVATION, 
SCI. & ECON. DEV. CAN., https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/062.nsf/eng/h_00108.html 
[https://perma.cc/8VKP-5TNL] (last modified June 25, 2019). 
131 Josh O’Kane & Tamsin McMahon, Ottawa Launches Data Strategy, Eyes Fines 
Tied to Tech Giants’ Revenue, GLOBE & MAIL (May 21, 2019), 
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/technology/article-ottawa-launches-new-
digital-charter-to-protect-canadians-personal/ [https://perma.cc/6CLS-YY9S]. 
132 Press Release, Canadian Heritage, Gov’t of Can., Helping Citizens Critically 
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provided through third-party educational activities. The objective is to 
enhance the resilience of citizens against online harms by giving them 
the tools to critically assess online information, to recognize malicious 
interference, to avoid online manipulation, and to engage effectively in 
public debate.133 A second investment of almost $20 million has been 
earmarked for a new Digital Citizen Research Program to address online 
disinformation and its impact on society.134 
 
Elections Canada also took steps to ensure that Canadians have access 
to reliable information in the lead-up to the 2019 federal election. It 
provided information on how to register, vote and be a candidate 
through a multimedia information campaign. Elections Canada also 
monitored the information environment to keep tabs on incidents that 
could undermine the administration of the election and on inaccurate 
information that could confuse people or prevent them from voting. In 
addition, the agency committed to take active steps to correct any false 
information about the electoral process, in particular with respect to fake 
accounts impersonating Elections Canada.135 
 
Various jurisdictions have invested in media literacy. For example, 
Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands teach school children digital 
literacy and fact-checking methods to detect misinformation.136 
California passed a law in 2018 that requires the Department of 
Education to provide media literacy resources on its website.137 
 
133 Id.  
134 Id.  
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Connecticut, Rhode Island, New Mexico, and Washington state have 
also passed legislation relating to media literacy education in schools.138  
 
In addition, online platforms have adopted media literacy programs. In 
2017, Google announced that it would be providing $500,000 for media 
literacy training aimed at Canadian elementary and high school 
students.139 The program was further expanded in May 2019.140 For the 
2019 election, Google launched a dedicated channel on its YouTube 
platform to highlight “authoritative” news coverage of the campaign.141 
It pledged that it would not attempt to balance stories in terms of their 
political leanings or coverage of the parties.142 Facebook recently 
launched a two-year partnership with MediaSmarts in order to promote 
media literacy.143 
 
The main drawback to citizen education and media literacy initiatives is 
that they are not on their own sufficient to address the problem of 
disinformation. Furthermore, these efforts do not lead to the education 
of the majority of the population. That being said, these educational 
efforts are preferable to a state of affairs in which neither the 




This Article has argued for a multifaceted public-private approach to the 
challenge of protecting the electoral process from the harms of 
disinformation. Such an approach employs a suite of complementary 
strategies—including disclosure rules, political ad registries, narrow 
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content-based regulations against false election speech, self-regulation 
by online platforms, norm-based initiatives, civic education, and media 
literacy. It also deploys a mix of regulatory styles, including legal 
regulation, self-regulation, and co-regulation. This Article has shown 
how the approach in Canada is multifaceted in both of these respects. In 
addition to incorporating a wide range of tactics by both public and 
private actors, the Canadian approach has adopted a mix of regulatory 
styles. The Article also canvasses the advantages and drawbacks of each 
individual tactic. 
 
In addition, this Article has focused on the dilemma posed by protecting 
the democratic process from disinformation while also protecting the 
freedom of speech. It has argued that a multifaceted public-private 
approach allows for the trade-off between disinformation and free 
speech to be optimized. The combined and interactive effects of a 
multifaceted approach provide helpful protections against some of the 
harms of disinformation. More importantly, the adoption of these 
multifaceted public-private strategies signals the importance of electoral 
integrity to citizens thereby bolstering public trust in elections, a key 




144 Wood & Ravel, supra note 3, at 1247 (noting that government regulation is 
“symbolically important”). 
